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Abstract
This paper analyses the effect of a long-term change in unemployment on crime in the US local
labour markets (1990-2007). During these last two decades, the US economy has experienced severe
structural changes caused by international trade shocks, and China has played a crucial role as a major
global exporter. The rapid growth of US exposure to China products triggers the increase in US local un-
employment rates. This study documents whether this increasing exposure to Chinese competitiveness
has indirectly contributed to the change in the propensity to commit crime through the displacement
of workers. I exploit the cross-market variation in import exposure stemming from initial differences in
industry specialisation to instrument the unemployment rate. The empirical evidence suggests that a
one per cent increase in unemployment rate, induced by a change in Chinese import products, leads to
almost a one per cent rise in the total crime rate.
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1 Introduction
Economists and policy-makers have long been interested in the relationship between labour market
conditions and crime. Since the seminal contributions both by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973),
joblessness has been identified as one of the most significant risk factors for criminal activity. Never-
theless, the existing literature on the link between crime and unemployment still faces considerable
challenges to causal inference due to omitted variable bias and reverse causality (see Mustard, 2010,
and references therein).
This paper contributes to this literature by taking advantage of a trade shock episode induced
by China’s growth in exports. I analyse whether the US exposure to Chinese imports - in a context
in which China has unexpectedly emerged as a major global economic power - have indirectly
contributed to the rise the US crime rate through displacement of workers. The connection between
trade-induced labor market shocks and crime has never been explored before in such context.1 Thus,
I consider the link between trade shock and crime in the US local labour markets (LLM hereafter),
investigating how unemployment reacts to both international trade and crime. In order to do so,
I exploit the cross-market variation in import exposure stemming from initial differences in US
industry specialisation to instrument the unemployment rate. Think of two almost identical US
LLM economies, for instance with similar GDP per capita, population and density, e.g. Buffalo,
NY and Orlando, FL, which hypothetically only differ from each other in their initial industry
specialisation. These two counties belong to the highest and the lowest 10th percentile of the
exposure to Chinese imports distribution, respectively. Thus, Buffalo, NY faces, ceteris paribus, a
major increase in crime rates caused by a (greater) worsening of LLM opportunities, deteriorated
by an increase in Chinese import competition.2
The effect of trade on crime is interesting in itself, since it highlights a dimension of adjustment
costs, beyond those directly associated with labor market reallocation, that has been overlooked in
the past. Illegal activities may be considered as an additional collateral adjustment cost of trade
through an increase in the unemployment rate at the local level. Illegality and unemployment
impose tremendous economic and social costs for the society with unemployment itself playing an
important role in the supply function of crime (Becker, 1968). In particular, US public expenditure
on criminal justice amounts to approximately $630 per capita which is about 2.5% of GDP and
private expenditure on crime prevention is at least as large (US Census 2007). The aggregate cost
of crime to society exceeds $1 trillion, which is approximately the size of the US healthcare sector
(Anderson, 1999).3 Moreover, the US economy has been dramatically shaped by international trade
shocks, which brought about important structural changes in US LLMs over the last two decades.
1The only other papers considering a somewhat similar aspects are Iyer and Topalova (2014) and Dix Carneiro
et al. (2016).
2I compute the ten-year equivalent values of (∆ imports from China to US)/worker in kUS$ for the cities with the
largest population in 1990 (Autor et al., 2013a). Buffalo, NY and Orlando, FL register an average Chinese import
exposure per worker of around 2 and 0.4, respectively.
3For example, Cohen et al. (1996) estimate the annual cost of crime in the United States which was about $450
billions. This is equivalent to $1,800 per capita per year. On top of this, the prison population has doubled since the
early 1990s and currently stands at over 2.2 million inmates, putting further pressure on the US welfare State.
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During the same period, China’s transition from a central planning to a market-oriented economy
and the reduction of its trade costs through World Trade Organization (WTO) accession played a
crucial role in the success of Chinese exports.4 US spending on Chinese goods quickly increased
from 0.6% in the early 1990s to 4.6% in 2007, with an even faster tendency after 2000, when China
joined the WTO. The greater US exposure to China products triggers the increase in US local
unemployment rates between 1990 to 2007.5 Therefore, estimating the trade-induced variations in
labour market conditions on crime is stil a relevant issue for economists and policy makers.
On the one hand, the early empirical literature on crime-unemployment generally finds an
inconsistent weak positive relationship between slowdowns and illegality (Cullen and Levitt, 1999;
Chiricos, 1987). As discussed by Freeman (1983), the effect tends to be modest and typically it
neglects to take into account the endogeneity issue behind this relationship. As a general result, the
estimates are downward biased. On the other hand, the most recent contributions explicitly tackle
the potential endogeneity in the relationship and Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) represents one
of the few exceptions.6 This new evidence, mostly based on national surveys, suggests a (larger)
positive significant effect on property crimes (Lin, 2008) and on the subgroups more at risk of
committing crime, e.g. low-skilled, young men (Gould et al., 2002). Differently from the previous
literature, I analyse the effect of a long-term change in unemployment on crime rate bearing in
mind that individuals may take some time to switch from legal to illegal sectors.
First, to mitigate the omitted variables bias, I extensively control for observable demographic
and economic variables at the local level. Additionally, I estimate a first-difference specification
in order to wipe out time-invariant heterogeneity. Finally, I exploit the cross-market variation in
import exposure due to initial differences in industry specialisation to instrument the unemployment
rate. To the best of my knowledge, this study provides the first powerful causal test of the long-
term change of unemployment on crime rates following a trade shock. To do so, I identify the
trade shocks to local unemployment considering cross-industry and cross-LLM variations in import
competition favoured by China’s spectacular rising productivity and falling barriers to trade after
its admission in the WTO. This represents a unique attempt to explain how crime rates react to
a large trade shock, i.e. whether the exogenous rise in competition from Chinese products explains
the change in arrest and offense rates though a displacement effect of workers over the period
1990-2007.7
In order to carry out my analysis, I empirically map the industry-specific trade shocks into a
number of aggregate outcomes. I then define US LLMs as sub-economies subject to heterogeneous
4Wood (1995) argues that the main cause of the deteriorating economic position of unskilled workers in developed
countries has been the expansion of trade with developing countries.
5Figure A.1 in Appendix shows this extraordinary growth.
6Mustard (2010) provides a detailed discussion about how recent research, primarily since the late 1990s, makes
substantial progress in resolving the endogeneity between crime and labour market conditions.
7A comprehensive literature review can be found in the Handbook on the Economics of Crime (Benson and
Zimmerman, 2010). Mustard (2010) offers a detailed discussion of the most recent papers that explicitly tackle the
endogeneity issues between crime and socio-economic conditions. The only other studies which reckon a possible link
between trade, labour conditions and crime are Iyer and Topalova (2014) and Dix Carneiro et al. (2016) but with
completely different settings with respect to this one.
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trade shocks according to their initial industry specialisation. The Commuting Zone (hereafter
CZ), which includes all metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in the United States, is the
logical geographic units for defining LLMs (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996; Autor et al., 2013a, 2015,
for instance). The analysis of the CZs is motivated by the notion that employers and workers
interact within a space bounded by places of work and places of residence. Generally, the empirical
studies on crime, due to the lack of precise geographical information, often consider the 50 States
in the US (Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001) and/or the counties as LLM (Gould et al., 2002).
The latter provides a substantially more detailed geographic structure than States but raises similar
methodological issues: there is no economic motivation why the boundaries of LLM should coincide
with State/counties ones, which are administrative definitions. Moreover, States are too large for
being considered a single LLM which may be characterised by huge heterogeneity. On the contrary,
the counties may often be too small and information is usually not available in publicly accessible
micro data. The possibility to map the crime phenomenon across US CZs represents a further
contribution to the current crime literature.8
The main findings suggest that the downturn, stemming from an increase in imports from
China, has a significant effect on those criminal activities to which individuals can easily turn when
their economic conditions worsen. Specifically, a $1,000 exogenous decadal rise in a CZ’s import
exposure per worker is predicted to reduce its unemployment rate by 0.13 percentage points. In
contrast to previous research, I generally find significant and sizable positive effects: a percentage
point increase in unemployment rate leads to a rise (i) in total crimes by 120, (ii) in violent crimes
by 21 and (iii) in property crimes by almost 98 per 100,000 residents. Differently from the (few)
previous studies, I estimate a greater elasticity leading to almost a one-to-one relationship.
There are several reasons that can explain these results. Firstly, it is worth noting, before
anything else, that State level aggregation yields downward biased results when estimating the
relationship between unemployment and crime due to the large heterogeneity effects within States.
Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) claim that national level data overstate the role of many explanatory
variables and, more recently, Levitt (2001) argues that “[...] national level data are only crude tool
in untangling the link between unemployment and crime because it wastes local variation and it
does not allow for a wide range of covariates”. Secondly, these results reflect the local average
treatment effect for those whose unemployment status is affected by the change in exposure to
China imports. The compliers, suffering more from these Chinese trade shocks, undergo longer
unemployment spells, which possibly explain the larger effect on crime. Finally, the analysis does
not show any particularly strong evidence of population adjustments at the CZ level with such
substantial exposure to Chinese imports. In fact, local effects of import shocks may partly diffuse
8CZs are clusters of counties that are characterised by strong commuting ties within each CZ, and weak ones across
CZs. The CZ’s boundaries are appropriate in analysing the relationship between local economic conditions and the
change in crime since CZs have been created exactly to capture, more than any other administrative definition, the
economic notion of local labour markets in the US (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996). The most popular concept for LLM in
recent research are Metropolitan Statistical Areas which are used, e.g. , by Card (2001), but they only cover areas of
the US with major urban population and the geographic definition of MSAs changes over time (Autor et al., 2013a,
2014).
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through migration between CZs. If labour is highly mobile across regions, trade may influence
workers (and potentially criminals) with its results not being identifiable at the regional level.
Nevertheless, it seems not to be the case, and also the recent literature on regional adjustment to
labour market shocks suggests that mobility responses to labour demand shocks across US cities
and States are slow and incomplete.9
It is therefore somewhat surprising that so little is known by economists and policy-makers
about how crimes react to trade shocks as a result of their disruptive effects on LLM structure and
job opportunities. Interestingly, despite the increasing role of China as a predominant worldwide
exporter, no one before attempted to understand whether trade-induced variations in economic
labour conditions may cause crime. In this regard, an increase in crime rate can be considered as
a further additional cost for the society. Therefore, if policy-makers were able to figure out and
forecast this potential link between trade and crime, they could dramatically limit the costs of LLM
displacement and finally reduce the probability of committing a crime. Developing effective tools
to regulate and alleviate the costs of trade adjustments, should be a high priority on the agenda
for policy-makers and applied economists. This is especially true when these costs translate into
criminal activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the background in crime,
unemployment and trade shock. Section 3 illustrates the identification, the empirical specification,
the data sources and the descriptive statistics. The results, the main mechanism and different
robustness checks are presented in Section 4. In the conclusions, I summarize the empirical findings
and I briefly discuss some policy implications.
9Topel (1986); Glaeser et al. (2006); Notowidigdo (2010); Autor et al. (2013a) reach similar conclusions.
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2 Background: Crime, Unemployment and Import from China
The past two decades have seen an abundant debate on the impact of international trade shocks
on US LLM opportunities and how these external forces have reshaped the developed economy.
Over the same period, China has played a role of guidance as emerging leader in the export sector
(Rodrik, 2006; Amiti and Freund, 2010). In particular, the general interest of trade scholars in
China relies on both its enormous influence as main exporter of (manufactured) goods all over the
world and by the scarse possibility to have “exogenous variation” in international trade. According
to Rodrik (2006), again the great success of China as the most relevant exporter around the
world was determined by a combination of its comparative advantage in producing tradable goods,
the opening to free markets and above all Chinese government itself which has played a crucial
guide for this prodigious growth. As a result, China has ended up with an export basket that is
significantly more sophisticated than what would normally be expected for a country at its income
level. Recently, Amiti and Freund (2010) find that China’s export is dramatically changed with
increasing export shares in electronics and machinery and a decline in agriculture and apparel.
All these factors - including opening to market economy which has involved rural-to-urban
migration of over 150 million workers and reducing the trade barriers with the WTO accession
- determine the remarkable China’s export growth. These elements create an “artificial” setting
to test different implications. Depending on the differences in the initial industry specialisation,
the impact of Chinese penetration asymmetrically affects the US LLM economy causing higher
unemployment.10 Bernard et al. (2006) find that US industries facing greater increases in exposure
to trade from low-wage countries, attributable in large account to China, are subject to higher rates
of plant exits. Similar effects are observed for other countries: growing Chinese import competition
increases plant closures and reduces firm growth in Mexico according to Iacovone et al. (2013)
and Utar and Ruiz (2013). Greater exposure to Chinese competition reduces employment growth
in Belgian firms (Mion and Zhu, 2013), Danish firms (Utar, 2014), and in a panel of firms from
twelve European countries (Draca et al., 2015). A novel study examines the impact of trade on
the structure of marriage and child-rearing in US households (Autor et al., 2014). The authors
conclude that import shocks concentrate on male employment, reduce marriage rates and fertility,
raise the fraction of births due to teen mothers, and, most significantly, increase the proportion
of children living either in poverty or in single-headed households. The evidence so far yields to
conclude that trade may be a costly and slowly process and, furthermore, it may be not beneficial
for some local labour markets.11 It comes natural to ask whether this increasing exposure to
Chinese competitiveness has indirectly contributed to the propensity of committing crimes through
the displacement of workers.
Legal labour market opportunities represent an important factors of committing crimes or
not. As Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) emphasize in their seminal works, a declining economy
10Balsvik et al. (2015), Donoso et al. (2015) and Autor et al. (2013a) come to similar conclusions.
11Recently, Autor et al. (2016) study whether the rise in trade integration between the US and China has an effect
on the polarization of US politics. They find that congressional districts which are more exposed to larger increases
in import competition removed moderate representatives from office in the 2000s.
6
provides higher incentives for the individuals to switch into illegal sector. It is clear that from
a theoretical point of view, declining labour market opportunities, which are manifested by an
increasing unemployment rate, worsen legal income opportunities and therefore make crime more
attractive and profitable.12 Consistent with this hypothesis, trade-induced supply shocks may have
a negative effect on labour market opportunities especially for those LLMs that more exposed to
the increase Chinese competitiveness. The increase of unemployment rate is often associated with
changing opportunity costs that determine the propensity to commit crime. Nevertheless, the crime
empirical results fail to show a consistent and strong association between downturns and crime, as
highlighted by Mustard (2010).
On the one hand, the majority of the early works which have analysed the relationship between
unemployment and crime rates tend to find small and positive effect of unemployment on economic-
related crimes but not on violent crime (Freeman, 1983; Piehl, 1998). Chiricos (1987) reviews
more than 60 studies on the crime-unemployment relationship and concludes that the evidence
appears “inconsistent” and “weak”. This relates to the fact that there was no attempt to tackle
the endogeneity issue between crime rate and unemployment. On the other hand, recent literature
has generally found a stronger, positive and significant effect on property (but not violent) crimes
(Lin, 2008). This significant change in the estimated effect of unemployment on crime has to be
attributed to a more appropriate list of controls or sub-group analyses of individual who can be
considered at “risk” of committing crimes (Gould et al., 2002). Additionally the recent need to
control for endogeneity caused by omitted variables, reverse causation and measurement error issues
determined a notable improvement in the estimation process (Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001;
Lin, 2008).
Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) represent the first attempt in providing an instrumental
variable estimates of the link between unemployment and crime. The authors exploit an arguably
exogenous variation across States in unemployment due to the closing of military bases and the
shocks to oil prices. They discuss the validity of both sets of instruments, which are unrelated to
crime, once other observable factors such as the imprisonment rate, demographic composition and
percentage in poverty have been controlled for. In their IV findings a one percentage point increase
in unemployment leads to an increase in property crime between 2.8% and 5%. Similarly Gould et al.
(2002), using a US panel of counties from 1979 to 1997, find a significant and positive effect. They
focus on those individuals at the margin of committing crime: young, unskilled, and low-educated
males. Their findings show that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate of the
group “at risk” group would increase property crime rate by 1-2%.13 Lin (2008) analyses the same
association using a panel of US States from 1974 to 2000. In order to instrument unemployment,
the author exploits the changes in the real annual exchange rates times the percentage of State
manufacturing sectors employees as an exogenous shock. In 2SLS estimates, one percentage point
12Other scholars focus on the idea of time allocation between legal and illegal activities and its influence on the
decision whether or not to participate in criminal activities (Grogger, 1998).
13Also Gro¨nqvist (2011) examines the relation between youth unemployment and crime. His results suggest that
joblessness explain a meaningful portion of why male youths are overrepresented among criminal offenders.
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rise in unemployment leads to a rise in crime rate by about 4% to 6%, which is about three times
larger than the OLS estimate.
Some authors demonstrate that the recessions may lead to substantial and persistently higher
rates of crime (de Blasio and Menon, 2013). Using a range of US and UK data to document a more
disturbing the effect of recessions, Bell et al. (2015) conclude recessions lead to short-term job loss,
lower levels of happiness and decreasing income levels. Others focused on the effect of exposure to
plant closure on crime using an individual-level panel data set containing criminal charges for all
unmarried and employed Norwegian men below 40 years old. Men originally employed in plants
that subsequently closed are fourteen per cent more likely to be charged of a crime than comparable
men in stable plants (Rege et al., 2009). Using detailed employer-employee Danish data, Bennett
and Ouazad (2015) study the impact of job loss on an individual’s probability to commit crime,
i.e. job losses in firms losing a substantial share of their workers, for workers with at least three
years of tenure. Displaced workers are more likely to commit offenses leading to conviction for
property crimes and for alcohol-related traffic violations in the two years following displacement.
Recently, Bindler (2015) provides evidence on the relationship between downturn and crime in the
light of increasing unemployment durations and temporary benefit extensions in the United States.
It is interesting to note that most of the crime papers analised above employ State level data, which
suffers from the problem of aggregation bias that has been discussed in the crime literature since
Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) and more recently stressed by Levitt (2001).
8
3 Identification and Empirical Specification
3.1 Local labour market geographical units
Looking at long-term change relationship between crime and unemployment requires a time-consistent
definition of the US LLM economy. Hypothetically, in this area both the employers and workers
interact within a space bounded by places of work and places of residence (Topel, 1986). The ideal
geographical definition should be determined by strong commuting ties within the LLM, and weak
commuting ties across LLM in order to, for instance, alleviate any migration spillovers and mobility.
Often, given the lack of precise geographical information or of data sources, empirical studies on
crime-unemployment consider the 50 States of the United States as labour market area (Raphael
and Winter-Ember, 2001, is a notable example). However, this broad definition presents several
drawbacks. To start with, there is no credible economic reason why the LLM dynamics should co-
incide with State boundaries which, indeed, appear too large for being considered a single LLM.14
On top of this, the unit of observation migh be characterised by large within-state heterogeneity
which may confound the relationship between crime and unemployment rates. Gould et al. (2002),
using the counties as LLM, made a considerable improvement in the crime literature, although
this geographic structure presents similar methodological concerns as the States. In fact, counties
represent a too small geographical unit and they suffer from migration spillovers. In recent studies,
the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (hereafter MSA) have been believed to be the natural location
in identifing a LLMs (Card, 2001; Mazzolari and Ragusa, 2013). On the one hand, MSAs have a
more economic appeal in the sense that they typically cover areas with commutable distances and
they may overlap State boundaries so they fit for studying the relationship between labour market
condition and crime. On the other hand, they do not cover rural areas and their geographical
definition differs over time which prevents to map the crime-unemployment relationship.
For all the above reasons, I pursue an alternative approach for the definition of LLM based on
the concept of Commuting Zones (CZs) which have been created with the explicit aim of capturing
the economic notion of LLMs and they do not reflect any political boundaries.15 This feature is
extremely relevant because it limits to a large extent the possibility of spillovers across market
areas including, among the others, commuting from other counties, short range county-to-county
migration and firms location choices. Tolbert and Sizer (1996) divide the United States in 741
clusters of counties and I focus on the 722 mainland CZs which include both metropolitan and
rural areas.16 CZs are particular suitable to measure the job opportunities because they cover the
entire area and workforce of the United States where employers, workers and residents are located
within commutable distances. Finally, for the aim of this study, it is plausible that the effects of
14In particular, there are many urban areas overlapping with State lines (e.g. , New York City/Jersey City, Wash-
ington D.C./Arlington, Kansas City MO/Kansas City KS), notably because cities developed on both sides of rivers
that serve as State boundaries (Dorn, 2009).
15By taking this regional economies as the unit of analysis, I circumvent the degrees of freedom problem endemic
to estimate the labour market consequences of trade (Autor et al., 2013a).
16Figure A.2 shows the 722 US CZs that cover the 48 mainland States. I follow Tolbert and Sizer (1996) who define
the CZs based on commuting patterns in the 1990 Census which are not fully matched with the 1980 definitions (Tol-
bert and Killian, 1987). The crosswalk is generously obtained from David Dorn in http : //www.ddorn.net/data.htm.
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Chinese imports will vary across CZ because there is considerable geographic variation in industry
specialisation across different economic structure.17 CZ specialized in industries whose outputs
compete with Chinese imports should react more strongly to the growth of these imports, inducing
structural changes in the labour market opportunities; these, in turn, trigger a rise in crime rate
through the displacement of workers in the most exposed sectors.
3.2 First-difference specification
In order to wipe out the time-invariant heterogeneity, I initially focus on the relationship between
crime and unemployment rates estimating a first-difference model for the long-term change interval
between 1990 and 2007. I then stack the ten-year equivalent first differences for the two periods,
1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2007 including separate time dummies for each decade. Due to the fact
that the model is estimated in first difference, the decade-specific model is directly comparable to
fixed effects regressions, while the stacked first difference models are similar to a three-period fixed
effects model with slightly less restrictive assumptions made on the error. This should remove any
concern related to the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between crime and unemployment.
For instance, if cultural characteristics across the sampled CZs systematically affect crime and LLM
behaviour, one CZ may display higher crime rates and worse LLM conditions independent of the
effect of interest for this analysis. Hence, I rule out all the variation in crime rates caused by factors
that vary within CZs and are constant over time, while the inclusion of time effects eliminates the
influence of factors that cause time-to-time changes in crime rates common to all CZs. Using the
full sample of 722 CZs, I fit models in first-difference of the following form:
∆Crimekc,t = β1∆Unemploymentc,t + γt + ∆X
′
c,tβ2 + ∆εc,t (1)
where ∆ is the (decade) first-difference operator.18 Crimekc,t is the crime rate, measured as the
number of arrests and offenses over working-age population, in Commuting Zone c, for the category
of crime k and in the decade t, which is equal to 0 and 1 over the period 1990-2000 and 2000-2007,
respectively. Additionally, γt indicates the dummies for each time decade and εc,t is the residual.
Standard errors are clustered at the State level to account for spatial correlations across CZs.19 The
main regressor is Unemploymentc,t which measures the ratio of the unemployed to the working-age
population. Furthermore, the vector X contains a rich set of economic and demographic controls at
CZ level with the aim of capturing any time-varying confounding factors in the crime-unemployment
17The largest export growth has been in machinery, and within this broad category, telecoms, electrical machinery,
and office machines have experienced the highest growth and make up the largest shares within machinery (Amiti
and Freund, 2010). Differently from Rodrik (2006), the export growth was accompanied by increasing specialisation
and it was mainly accounted for by high export growth of existing products rather than in new varieties (Amiti and
Freund, 2010).
18Following Autor et al. (2013a), the 2000-2007 change in import growth is multiplied by 10/7 to place it in ten-year
equivalent terms. I consider the period 1990-2007 because data on trade are available from 1991 and I explicitly not
analyse the period of Great Recession in order to avoid possible confoundings to the identification.
19Estimating the model as a fixed-effects regression assumes that the errors are serially uncorrelated, while the first-
differenced specification is more efficient if the errors are a random walk (Wooldridge, 2010). I cluster the standard
errors at US State level in all models and I run some sensitivity at CZ level. The estimates are robust.
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relationship (Cook and Zarkin, 1985).20
First, in order to control for changes in demographic or racial structure composition, I include to
the main specification three distinct age-group categories: the share of people in 15-34, 35-49, 50-64
age bands which are meant to measure the change in age distribution at the CZ level (Fougere et al.,
2009). Second, for each age category, I define the proportion of CZ residents that are White, Black,
Indian or Asian, which are included to pick the decade differences across race distributions for the
population subgroup with higher offending rates relative to other Americans (Levitt, 2001). Third,
I control for the share of individuals with low, medium and high level of educational attainment
defined as less than high school diploma, high school diploma or higher but no bachelor degree
and finally with bachelor degree or higher, respectively. The predicted influence of this variable on
crime is hard to determine a priori. The level of education can affect crime through three main
mechanisms namely an income effect, short-sightedness and self-incapacitation.
To begin with, education increases the payoff to legitimate work which, in turn, makes working
more worthwhile than criminal activity. Nevertheless this relationship may also work in the other
direction, as education can also increase the earnings from certain crimes (e.g. white-collar crime
such as fraud). Furthermore, young people who leave education earlier tend to care more about
today than they do about tomorrow so in other words they prioritise short-term gratification in
favour of long-term benefits. This makes them more likely to undertake risky activities, such as
crime. Finally, self-incapacitation: time spent in school means less time on the streets committing
crime.21 Following Lin (2008), I additionally characterize each local labour market including a
measure of federal income assistance, which comprises SSI (Supplemental Security Income), TANF
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) and SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance), the
share of Democratic and Republican voters in each presidential election over the period 1990-2007
and police force rate.
In the robustness analysis I further control for the share of non-participating individuals in
the labour force. Nevertheless, the bulk of this category comprises full-time homemakers, retirees,
students who have no other occupation and people permanently unable to work, all of which are
in principle less likely to commit a crime. Following Levitt (1996, 1997), I also consider the prison
population rate, which affects crime rates negatively through the deterrence effect. A positive effect
of unemployment on crime is likely to lead to a positive correlation between unemployment and
prison populations (assuming that some offenders are caught and sent to prison). Incarceration
rates would downwardly bias the main results if they reduced crime rates via incapacitation and
deterrence. A last set of covariates encompasses the average wage at commuting zone level and the
20I do not apply any logarithm to count crime data as it is detailedly explained in Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
Moreover, using this smaller geographical unit, I may risk to drop the CZs which show zero event for a particular
crime category. On top of this, the estimates using the logarithm of crime rate produce similar results but with
smaller sample size.
21The literature on the relationship between education and crime is growing fast and Machin et al. (2011); Fella and
Gallipoli (2014) represent a notable example. As discussed by Lochner (2004) and Lochner and Moretti (2004), human
capital increases the opportunity cost of crime from foregone work and expected costs associated with incarceration.
In the other contribution, Lochner and Moretti (2004), using Census and FBI data, find that schooling significantly
reduces the probability of incarceration and arrest.
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results are unaltered.22 A complete list of the variables with the correspondent sources is shown in
Subsection 3.4.
3.3 IV approach and the role of trade shock
As previously discussed, the relationship between these two phenomena may be biased by omitted
variables, simultaneity or simply measurement error. Then, the estimated correlation between the
LLM condition and crime might be flawed so that, ex ante, the causation of unemployment on
crime is not obvious, often leading to reverse causality concerns. For instance, individuals com-
mit crimes based on unobservable characteristics, which may be associated with ones determining
unemployment. If the unobservables are positively (negatively) correlated with the unemployment
and they are also positively (negatively) correlated with participation in the illegal market, the
estimated effect is downward biased. Additionally, reversed causation (i.e. that criminal activity
reduces the employability of offenders, or that economic growth is harmed by a high crime rate
in the region) may also bias the unemployment effect on crime. Recent research using instrumen-
tal variable techniques shows that this relationship is underestimated due to endogeneity between
unemployment and crime (Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; Fougere et al., 2009; Lin, 2008).
Since the results may contain bias coming from simultaneity or simple measurement error, and
knowing that the list of potential omissions is never complete, it gets complicated to correctly iden-
tify the effect of unemployment on crime. Hence, to obtain a consistent estimator, an instrumental
variable Z is necessary. For this reason, in order to capture the effect of a long-term change in
unemployment on crime at the local labour market level, an exogenous source of variation, which
will only affect crime rate through a change in labour market opportunity is needed. This mea-
sure should not be determined by endogenous factors that contemporaneously affect the outcome
variable (crime). A credible exogenous variation, which may impact the unemployment dynamic is
essential and this can be identified in the trade literature. I exploit the “unprecedented” rise in the
Chinese exports across the world to instrument the unemployment rate. The interest of scholars
in China is due to both by its large quantitative importance as the main exporter of goods, and by
the scarceness of an exogenous variation for labour market conditions, especially when the aim is
to look at a long-term change effects.
Three peculiarities of China’s experience are useful to overcome the challenges in identifying
the casual effects of trade shocks on LLM conditions. First, China’s export growth was completely
unexpected and it caught academics and economists by surprise (Autor et al., 2015). Second, the
isolation under Mao created generous opportunities for successive catch up (Zhu, 2012). A final
important key feature of China’s rise is its distinctive and overwhelmingly comparative advantage
22The wages are in nominal and not real terms. Since I lack complete data on prices at the CZ level, I leave
consideration of regional variation in price changes out of the empirical analysis. Nevertheless, when wages of
workers in a labour market decrease, the price of local services also decrease, and since non-traded services have
a large expenditure share, the real wages changes have a very weak association with nominal wages changes. As
discussed by Monte (2014), there is basically no difference in the distribution of gains of exposed and unexposed
locations. To conclude, if price decreases, the natural consequence is the increase of purchasing, making crime
relatively more costly.
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in producing industrial goods. This trade concentration means that China’s growth has represented
a large positive net global supply shock and the impact of its rise are consequently likely to vary
across regional and national economies according to their initial patterns of industry specialisation.
The identification strategy in fact relates to changes in exposure to international trade shock
to US CZs with the growth in US imports from China between 1990 and 2007, exploiting a cross-
market variation in import exposure stemming from initial differences in industry specialisation.23
Hence, I concentrate on the trade with China because it is responsible for nearly all of the expansion
in US imports from low-income countries since the beginning of the 90’s. As described by Chen
et al. (2010), China’s spectacular increase in exports has been primarily determined by its internal
reforms, which triggered the transition to a market-oriented economy and that involved a migration
from rural to urban areas of around 150 million workers.24 This radical change came together with
its accession to the World Trade Organization in the early 2000’s. These transformations have
determined China leadership in the exports to the US especially among the low-income countries.
In the globalization context, trade with middle-income nations may also matter and this can be
used as an alternative unexpected shock to the LLMs. An evident case, for instance, is Mexico,
which can be historically considered as one of the most notable exporter to the US economy. In this
case, finding a credible exogenous source of variation in Mexico’s export growth is complicated. For
example, the rise of US import from Mexico may be caused by changes in US bilateral trade policy,
which could be influenced by economic conditions in the United States rather than an unusual
increase in Mexican productivity. Moreover, a recent contribution by McLaren and Hakobyan
(2010) shows no evidence of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) effects on US LLMs.
In a different manner, China experienced an incredible productivity growth over the period 1990-
2007 and arguably, the simultaneity in the joint determination of trade barriers, trade itself and
investment flows are less of an issue.
In this framework, it is problematic to justify how a trade shock can impact the economy at
the CZ level because trade shocks may play out in general equilibrium context so one needs to
empirically map many industry-specific shocks into a small number of aggregate outcomes. Using
(national) labour market unit at annual frequencies, it is possible to have very few observations left
and many confounding factors. Using CZ as the unit of analysis, I bypass the degrees-of-freedom
problem endemic of estimating the labour market consequences of trade. Therefore, it is then
possible to identify the labour market consequences of trade as far as (i) CZs differ in their pattern
of industry specialisation, and (ii) frictions in labour markets allow regional differences in the LLM
conditions to persist over the medium run. A greater exposure to trade with China affects local
labour market structure increasing the unemployment rate in those CZs most exposed to foreign
competition.
Following the trade literature, I then define a general measure of trade shock coming from
23The identification strategy is related to that used by Autor et al. (2013a), who consider the relationship between
imports from China and different labour market outcomes in the US.
24Autor et al. (2014) report some other important channels through which China had this incredibly penetration
in the world market gaining access to long-run banned foreign technologies, capital goods and intermediate inputs
being permitted to operate in the country.
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the increase in Chinese competitiveness. This indicator measures the LLM exposure to import
competition which is the change in Chinese import exposure per worker in a CZ, where imports









In this expression Lit is the start of period employment (year t) in CZ i and ∆Mucjt is the observed
change in US imports from China in industry j between the start and end of the period. In detail,
I need to allocate to each CZ a share of total national import growth and divide this import value
by a CZ’s total employment. Hence equation (2) yields a measure of “import growth per worker”
(in $1,000’s of US dollar). The variation arises from two sources: differential concentration of
employment in manufacturing versus non-manufacturing activities and specialisation in import-
intensive industries within CZ. Local economies that are specialised in industries whose outputs
compete with Chinese imports react more strongly to the growth of these imports.25 The variable
∆importuit measures overall trade exposure experience. Furthermore, it is relevant to mention
that the CZ exposure variable is by nature a proxy of imports and they are not shipped to import
competing CZs for redistribution but rather are distributed broadly to wholesalers, retailers, and
consumers (Autor et al., 2013a).
A concern may be related to the fact that US imports from China may be affected by US
demand shocks rather than just China’s growing productivity and falling trade costs, which may
be correlated with unemployment rate. To correctly identify only the supply-driven component of
Chinese imports, which should cause the job displacement at CZ level, I use the contemporaneous
composition and growth of Chinese imports in eight other developed countries and ten year lagged









Equation (3) is similar to (2) and it only differs in two aspects. First, I use the realized imports
from China to other high-income markets (∆Mocjt), which substitutes the previous ∆Mucjt and,
second, in place of start-of-period employment levels by industry and region, I lag the variable by
ten years to avoid any simultaneity.27
25Information on industry employment structure by CZs, including employment in 397 manufacturing industries
Lijt, is derived from the County Business Patterns data following Autor et al. (2013a).
26Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland are the eight other high-
income countries with comparable trade data over the period 1990-2007.
27In Subsection 4.3, I run some robustness checks keeping the propensity to import fixed at the beginning of the
first decade. The results are similar.
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3.4 Data and summary statistics
In the following, I describe the data sources and discuss some descriptive statistics over the period
1990-2007. I aggregate the county data at the CZ level to estimate the link between unemployment
and criminal rate at the same (geographical) unit. In order to match the geographic information
contained in the IPUMS data to Commuting Zones I use the crosswalk developed by Autor et al.
(2013a).28
Crime data come from the master file of the Uniform Crime Reporting program, UCR hereafter.
Since 1930, law enforcement agencies in the United States have been participating in gathering crime
statistics through the UCR program. The FBI administers the program and the participation,
which is voluntary for all agencies at county level. The county-level crime data consider both less
serious and more frequent property criminal activities and more serious and less frequent violent
crimes. Using the “standard” definition in UCR program, I split the total crime category into two
main components: (i) violent, which includes murders, rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults;
(ii) property, which covers burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts and arson. Vandalism, fraud,
stolen property and weapons violations are other crimes I look at because they are very closely
related to property delinquency. Arrest rates are calculated as the number of arrests, aggregated at
CZ level, divided by the working-age population in the observational unit and scaled by 100 for the
ease of interpretation. Illegality is often measured by arrests but not all of the felonies are detected
by the police and, for this reason, I also collect data on the offenses, which are divided into similar
standard categories as I previously defined. From the same source of data, I additionally collect
information on police force and the total number of prisoners.
Trade data are recovered from the UN Comtrade Database on US imports at the six-digit
Harmonized System (HS) product level and then aggregate up to four-digit SIC industries.29 Due
to delays in countries implementing the HS classification, 1991 is the first year for which I can
obtain data across many high-income economies (Autor et al., 2013a). The annual value of US
imports for the years 1991, 2000, and 2007 (with all values in 2007 US$) is reported in Table 1,
Panel A. The import value has exponentially increased over the period 1990-2007, as it jumped
from $26 to $121 billions in 2000 and it reached its peak in 2007 ($330 billion). In the second
column I show the value of annual US exports to China in 1992, 2000, and 2007. Comparing the
results, it is plausible to conclude that the main change in trade between China and the United
States (over the period) is due to an astounding increase of US imports rather than exports to
China.30
Panel B shows the trade flows from the same exporters to a group of eight high-income countries
located in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New
28In order to group the counties into a single CZ, I use the crosswalk available in the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series projects (IPUMS) at this url: https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/1990lma.shtml.
29The data are available at http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx and in order to concord these data to four-digit
SIC I use both the crosswalk in Pierce and Schott (2012) and in Autor et al. (2013a).
30In order to put the two periods on a comparable decadal scale, trade growth during 1991 to 2000 and during
2000 to 2007 has been multiplied with the factors 10/9 and 10/7, respectively as it has been done by Autor et al.
(2013a).
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Table 1: Value of the trade with China for the US and other high-income countries
Trade with China (in billions 2007 US$)
Panel A: United States Panel B: Other developed countries
Imports from China Exports to China Imports from China Exports to China
1991-1992 26.3 10.3 28.2 26.6
2000 121.6 23.0 94.3 68.2
2007 330.0 57.4 262.8 196.9
Growth 1991-2007 1156% 456% 832% 639%
Notes: Trade data is reported for the years 1991, 2000, and 2007, except for exports to China, which are all first
available in 1992. The set of “other developed countries” in panel B comprises Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.
Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland). Like the United States, these countries experienced a dramatic
increase in imports from China between 1991 and 2007, especially after China’s WTO accession, and
a more modest growth of imports from other medium- or low-income countries.31 The high-income
regions are useful to isolate the foreign-supply-driven component of changes in Chinese import
penetration. As showed by Autor et al. (2015), the annual US imports from China increased
by 304 billion dollars between 1991 and 2007, while Chinese imports grew by 235 billion dollars
across the eight other high-income countries offering comparable trade data for the full sample
period. Moreover, the pattern of import growth across industries is highly correlated among the
US and the other countries, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.55 (Switzerland) to 0.96
(Australia). The fact that China made comparable gains in penetration by detailed sector across
numerous countries in the same time interval suggests that China’s falling prices and diminishing
trade and tariff costs in these surging sectors are the basis for its success.32 The potential exposure
of Commuting Zones to Chinese import competition comes from a detailed information on local
industry employment structure in the years 1980, 1990 and 2000, which is taken from the County
Business Patterns (CBP) data.33 CBP is an annual data series that provides information on
employment, firm size distribution, and payroll by county and industry and it covers all US.
Unemployment, duration data, individuals not in the labour force (hereafter NILF) and pop-
ulation structure are recovered from the Census Integrated Public Use Micro Samples for the years
1990 and 2000 (Steven et al., 2010), and the American Community Survey (hereafter ACS) for
2006 through 2008.34 The 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census samples include 5% of the US population,
while the pooled ACS samples include 3% of the population. Federal income assistance comprises
Unemployment Insurance benefits, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, income
assistance benefits from SSI (Supplemental Security Income), TANF (Temporary Assistance for
31As discussed in detail by Autor et al. (2013a), these countries have been selected because they are the richest
nations for which disaggregated HS trade data are available back to early nineties.
32All imports are inflated to 2007 US$ using the Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator.
33CBP data is extracted from the Business Register, a file of all known US companies that is maintained by the
US Census Bureau, and it is available for download in http : //www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html. I follow the
online material available in http : //www.ddorn.net/data.htm and in Autor et al. (2013a) to build the propensity to
import for each CZ.
34The CZs’ sample is selected with the individuals aged between 16 and 64 and who were working in the year
preceding the selected survey as in Autor et al. (2013a). The population composition comes from an excellent
survey for recent 1969-on US population at the county level and by age, race, sex, and more recently Hispanic origin,
which is available at http://www.nber.org/data/seer u.s. county population data.html. Finally, the level of educational
attainment at CZ level is derived from Eckhardt (2011) and is freely downloadable at hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15351.
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Needy Families) are from Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (here-
after REA). The REA data provides the exact amount of annual transfers by county and transfer
type unless the transfer is very small (i.e. positive amounts of transfers that are below 50,000 dol-
lars in a given county and year). All transfer amounts are inflated to 2007 US$ using the Personal
Consumption Expenditure deflator. Finally, the share of Democrats and Republicans are collected
from American National Election Studies. I select the presidential elections in 1988, 1996 and 2004
which proxy 1990, 2000 and 2007 respectively.
The summary statistics provided in Table B.1 show that, approximately, 6.5 crimes per 1000
residents were committed over the period 1990-2007 in the United States, albeit these are property
crimes in the great majority of cases (5 crimes). As expected the number of offenses is higher with
respect to the arrests. The Table also shows that there are approximately 400 prisoners and 790
police force per capita (100,000 residents).35 The average unemployment rate is around 4.6 per cent
and the national trend over the periodo is decreasing. Understanding how crime rates respond to
variations in economic labour conditions is a relevant task for economists and policy-makers but it
is generally difficult to have a clear picture, especially in the case of aggregated data (for instance
at the State level).
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0 5 10 15
Unemployment rate
Total crime rate Fitted values
When looking at the raw data, as Figure 1 shows, higher unemployment rates are associated
with higher total crime rates at CZ level. This mere correlation hightlights a positive relationship
between these two phenomena. Obviously, there are numerous factors that could potentially change
the nature of this correlation but it is still informative on the expected results. This correlation
explains the reasons why economists typically conclude that unemployment or a decline in labour
market conditions may lead to an increase in crime due to the worsening opportunities in the legal
employment sectors, which make committing crimes more attractive activities (Ehrlich, 1973).
Figure 2 helps to clarify how the crime distribution depends on the specific unemployment rate
quantile. Looking at the distribution of crime rate conditioning on the unemployment rate by
35Differently from the crime rate and the unemployment rate, these two variables are not expressed in per cent.
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quintile, I observe a positive propensity to commit more illegal activities moving from the lowest
to the highest quintiles albeit this does not always hold across groups (obviously less crime in the
bottom distribution). The vertical line, which indicates the average crime rate for each quintile,
moves to the right supporting the general idea that a higher crime rate is associated with higher
unemployment rate. I separately analyse the two decades and then I pool the data. The final
result, even less evident than before, is a positive link between crime and unemployment rate also
across distributions.
Finally, Figure A.3 and A.4 provide a general picture of the crime-unemployment relationship
and the instrument, namely the exposure to China products. In particular, these figures show the
geographical distribution of crime rate, unemployment rate and Chinese import exposure. Each
map describes the impact of these phenomena using warmer (colder) colours for relatively larger
(smaller) effects. Figure A.3, which refers to the decade 1990-2000, shows the total crime rates (in
the Top Panel), the unemployment rate (in the Middle Panel) and the import exposure from China
to eight high income countries (in the Bottom Panel). Figure A.4 refer to the decade 2000-2007
and it shows similar correspondence between the crime rate, the unemployment rate and Chinese
exposure, which became more clear in the following decade. I will deepen these initial findings in
Subsection 4.2 with regard to the First-Stage and Reduced Form equation where I also condition on
a rich set of covariates. This preliminary descriptive analysis shows a positive correlation between
these three variables and the evidence suggests that higher unemployment rates are associated with
larger increases in Chinese import competition and, then, crime rates act accordingly.
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4 Results: the Effect of Unemployment on Crime
In this section, I empirically analyse the relationship between labour market conditions and criminal
activities both in terms of arrest and offense rates. To the extent that the variables omitted from
the regression are correlated with the measure of labour market condition, there is scope for omitted
variable bias. A relevant development in mitigating the bias from unobserved variables is the use of
panel data estimation technique that allows to control for the time-invariant heterogeneity. As long
as the heterogeneity is constant over time, it is possible to wipe out the omitted variables through
differencing, for example by taking the model in first difference (FD). In Subsection 4.1, I initially
estimate the model in FD using the repeated observations over time (1990, 2000 and 2007). As
I explain in Subsection 3.2, the decade-specific model in equation (1) is equivalent to time fixed
effects regression, while the stacked first difference model is similar to a three-period fixed effects
model with slightly less restrictive assumptions made on the error term (Wooldridge, 2010).
Still, ex ante, the direction of causality is not guaranteed due to potential time-varying unob-
servables, which may bias the results of the crime-unemployment relationship. Hence, in order to
identify the effects of unemployment at the local labour market level an exogenous source of vari-
ation is needed. I exploit the cross-market variation in Chinese import exposure stemming from
initial differences in industry specialisation. This identification strategy predicts that rises in Chi-
nese imports within a given industry (e.g. , apparel, footwear, furniture, luggage, toys) that occurs
simultaneously in the US and other high-income countries are predominantly driven by the surge
in Chinese productivity that have accompanied its transition to a market economy (Brandt et al.,
2012) and by the reduction of trade barriers resulting from China’s accession to the World Trade
Organization. As discussed by Autor et al. (2013b), since manufacturers within an industry tend to
cluster geographically, China’s rising penetration of specific industries results in sharp disparities in
the change in import exposure across CZs. The following Subsections discuss the empirical findings
and the main mechanism with some robustness checks.
4.1 First difference estimations
Table 2 presents the regressions in FD where the dependent variable is the total crime rate at CZ
level, which includes both violent and property crime. In column (1), I show the main estimate,
only controlling for the specific decade effects. The evidence is clearly in favour of a strong positive
relationship between crime and unemployment rate once the time-invariant unobserved heterogene-
ity is considered. The effect is significant at the one per cent level of confidence and it suggests
that one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a rise in total
crimes by 35 per 100,000 residents. In column (2) I add a long set of controls, which are meant
to capture the US population structural changes. For each age class, I define the change in the
proportion of White, Blacks, Asians and Indians (baseline) with the idea to capture the observable
differences in age and racial composition, which may bias the results. As expected, the age-race
profiles are relevant determinants of the crime-unemployment association and the resultant point
estimate shrinks to 0.019 significant at the ten per cent level of confidence. Overall, the results are
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in line with the recent findings on ethnic minorities. Some authors interpret this decline as resulting
from greater upward mobility and a better social standing among African Americans during the
past two decades. Nevertheless “[...] there may be a growing aﬄuent black middle class, but at
the same time, the black underclass appears to have become even more disenfranchised and more
segregated from the rest of society” as discussed by Steffensmeier et al. (2011). At last, in line
with the expectations, Table 2 shows a negative effect of the elderly characteristics (50-64) on the
propensity to commit a crime.
Table 2: Total Crime Rate and Unemployment Rate, First-Difference Regressions, 1990-2007
Arrests Total Crime Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Unemployment 0.035*** 0.019* 0.023** 0.019* 0.018*
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
[Elasticity] [0.25] [0.13] [0.16] [0.13] [0.13]
γt -0.071*** 0.036 0.044 0.033 0.041
(0.019) (0.039) (0.032) (0.094) (0.092)
∆Age 15-34
White 1.870*** 2.909*** 3.061*** 3.161***
(0.657) (0.926) (0.791) (0.810)
Black -4.775** -3.566 -3.462 -3.604
(2.350) (2.688) (2.632) (2.646)
Asian -5.379 -5.949 -6.353 -5.494
(8.148) (9.395) (8.607) (8.586)
∆Age 35-49
White -0.767 -1.999 -2.130 -2.320
(1.198) (1.354) (1.400) (1.436)
Black 2.779 -1.86 -1.643 -1.498
(5.205) (4.267) (4.252) (4.236)
Asian -28.343* -24.437 -23.473 -23.323
(16.420) (16.197) (15.425) (15.238)
∆Age 50-64
White -1.501** -2.213** -2.335** -2.519***
(0.712) (0.901) (0.885) (0.918)
Black -3.757* -5.645** -6.045** -5.957**
(2.027) (2.328) (2.473) (2.451)
Asian -30.884 -19.234 -18.364 -19.069
(22.426) (23.001) (21.731) (21.249)
∆No Diploma 0.661 0.497 0.611
(0.861) (0.842) (0.824)
∆High School 2.241** 2.092** 2.127**
(1.011) (0.937) (0.938)






Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444
Clusters 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.03 0.151 0.179 0.182 0.184
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). The dependent variable is total crime
rate which includes both violent and property crime. All the variables are expressed
in first-difference (rates). Arrests are scaled by 100 for the ease of interpretation. All
regressions include a dummy for the 2000-2007 period (γt). The reference category
for the race profile, the level of education and the voters are Indians, individuals who
obtained at least a bachelor degree and percentage of people who voted Democratic
party, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state
level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
In column (3) I include other relevant controls such as educational attainment. As extensively
discussed in the literature (Machin et al., 2011; Lochner and Moretti, 2004), there are a number of
reasons to believe that education may affect subsequent crimes. Generally, the results are mildly
affected and the coefficient of unemployment marginally increases to 0.023 significant at the five per
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cent level of confidence. Following Lin (2008) and Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001), I additionally
include other relevant covariates, namely the change in percentage of Republican voters, which is
used as a proxy of criminal-justice system, and the government expenditure in SSI, AFDC/TANF
and SNAP programs. These controls include unemployment and social security disability insurance,
income assistance benefits from supplemental security income and temporary assistance for needy
families. These sets of variables are meant to pick any variation in the benefit claims, which may
be associated with a decline in the economic conditions. As a consequence, it increases defacto
the relative payoff of criminal activity, thus inducing workers to substitute away from the legal
sector towards the illegal sector. Both controls do not have any statistical significant impact on
the outcome variable. Results are shown in columns (3) and (4).
Finally, in column (5), I include the (per capita) police force at CZ level as a measure of
deterrence effects (Lin, 2008). Deterrence plays a crucial role in economic models of crime. Police
forces deter crime by increasing the perception that criminals will be caught and punished. The
variable is negatively correlated (not significant at the conventional level) with total crime rates.
Another measure, frequently used in empirical analysis, of deterrence effects is the incarceration
rate (Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001). I further include the prison population in the robustness
check and the results are invariant.
The total crime index is a combination of violent and property crimes. In Table B.2, I study
the relationship between the unemployment and crime rate at CZ level focusing on the two main
components: violent (Panel A) and property crime rates (Panel B). The former is the “more
aggressive” component in which an offender uses or threatens force upon a victim. Violent crimes
may, or may not, be committed with weapons. On top of this, some crimes, such as robberies,
which are defined as violent, may depend on economic need: this relates to the action of taking
or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person. Violent
crime rate, among others, includes burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle theft and arson. On the
contrary, property crime involves the taking of property, and does not generally involve force or
threat of force against a victim. Crimes against property are divided into two groups: destroyed
property and stolen property. When property is destroyed, it would be called arson or vandalism.
Examples of the act of stealing property is robbery. As expected, although unemployment has
a positive effect on property crime, I do not find a clear link between worsening labour market
conditions and violent crime rates. The magnitude of this effect is economically small and not
statistically significant at any conventional level. By the same token, the evidence suggests an
increase in property crime by 15 units.36
4.2 Impact of labour market trade shock on crime
The empirical findings of the previous section may still be plagued by omitted confounding factors
that are not captured by the first-difference specification. As a consequence, an instrumental
36The correspondent elasticity for violent and property crime is 0.08 and 0.13, respectively, which is in line with
the crime literature. Note that these results still suffer from downward bias.
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variable approach is needed to tackle the endogeneity issue related to the crime-unemployment
relationship. In order to identify the long-tem change effect of unemployment on crime rates, an
exogenous source of variation is needed. Endogenous factors should not determine this change and
I aim at describing the identification strategy I use, namely the effect of rising Chinese import
competition between 1990 and 2007 on crime rate at CZ level passing through a change in the
unemployment rate. The instrumental variable strategy, discussed in Subsection 3.3, identifies the
component of US import growth that is due to Chinese productivity and trade costs, which affect
local labour market conditions. Recall that if the model specifications leave out crime-determining
factors, which are correlated with unemployment and that are not picked up by the fixed effects,
the previous results in Subsection 4.1 will be possibly biased. Moreover, if crime rates reverse the
direction of the causation with unemployment rates, OLS inference will not be appropriate.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































−5 0 5 10
e(change in import exposure per worker (in kUSD) | X)
First Stage Regression, 1990−2007




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































−5 0 5 10
e(change in import exposure per worker (in kUSD) | X)
Reduced Form Regression, 1990−2007
coef = .02473447, (robust) se = .00839093, t = 2.95
Notes: Added variable plots of First-stage and reduced form estimates: change in import exposure per worker (Australia,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland) and total crime rate.
Using CZs level data it is possible to map the trade exposure from China. This approach
is valid for identifying the labour market consequences of trade to the extent that CZs differ in
their pattern of industry specialisation and frictions in labour markets allow regional differences
to persist over the medium-long run. Therefore, before discussing the second-stage estimates of
the unemployment effects on crime, an evaluation of the strength of the first-stage relationship
is appropriate. Figure 3 sketches the estimation strategy. On the one hand, the left picture
reveals the substantial predictive power of the high-income-country instrument for changes in US
unemployment rate. A $1,000 predicted increase in import exposure per CZ worker corresponds
to a robust rise in unemployment rate by 0.13 percentage points. On the other hand, the right
picture plots a reduced form (OLS) regression of the change in crime rate on the instrument. This
figure shows a substantial increase in (total) crime in the CZs facing large increases in Chinese
import exposure. The results suggest that there is indeed a reduced form effect of increase Chinese
competition on crime rates. This evidence is itself striking and it demonstrates an intended and
disturbing effect of trade shock.37
37For an easier visualization, Figure 3 shows the results without 4 Commuting Zones which are Calloway County,
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Table 3: Total Crime and Unemployment Rate, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007
Arrests Total Crime Rate Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate
Panel A: 2nd Stage (1) (2) (3)
∆Unemployment 0.120*** 0.021 0.098***
(0.043) (0.013) (0.032)
[Elasticity] [0.78] [0.59] [0.85]
All controls
√ √ √
Observations 1444 1444 1444
Clusters 48 48 48
R2 0.013 0.001 0.041
RMSE 0.339 0.097 0.275




Kleibergen-Paap LM test (p-value) 0.000
C.D.W. F-stat 63
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). The dependent variable is total crime rate (over the
working-age population), which includes both violent and property crime. All the variables are expressed
in first-difference (rates). I rescale the outcome by 100 for the ease of interpretation. All regressions
include a dummy for the 2000-2007 period (γt). The reference category for the race profile, the level of
education and the voters are Indians, individuals who obtained at least a bachelor degree and percentage
of people who voted Democratic party, respectively. First-stage estimates in Panel B also include the
control variables that are indicated in the second-stage. The instrument in all the regressions is Chinese
imports in eight developed countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the State
level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
Table 3 presents the 2SLS estimates of the unemployment effects, induced by an increase in
Chinese import competition, on total, violent and property crime rates at CZ level.38 In Panel
B, I report the first-stage statistics, which integrate the previous information found in Figure 3.
The result from first-stage regression suggests that ∆Imports China-other is a strong predictor of
US unemployment with an F-statistic around 27, larger than the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10
proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). I reject the null hypothesis of weak instrument problem
using both the Kleibergen-Paap LM test and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (Kleibergen and Paap,
2006). It is worth clarifying what the estimated model identifies and how the IV estimates should
be interpreted. Following Imbens and Angrist (1994), the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)
measures the effect for those whose unemployment status is affected by the instrument, though
this requires a suitable monotonicity assumption. This means that, while the instrument may have
no effect on some unemployed, all those who are affected are influenced in the same way. In this
context, I identify the LATE for those whose unemployment status is affected by the change in
exposure to China products. Hence, the compliers are those unemployed who are triggered by
the increase in Chinese competitiveness at CZ level and they suffer more from these trade shocks
inducing longer unemployment spells. I shed light on the main channel through which the rise
in the Chinese import penetration affects the duration in unemployment in the Subsection 4.3.
This interpretation would also reasonably motivate why I find the IV estimates to be larger, in
magnitude, than the OLS ones. This is consistent with Imbens and Angrist (1994) who show that,
in the presence of heterogeneous effects, the IV estimates may well exceed the OLS estimates.39
KY (25402), Edwards County, IL (14801), Chase County, KS (29402) and McLeod County, MN (21201). The main
analysis includes the all sample of the 722 CZs.
38The estimation with the full set of covariates is shown in Table B.3, in Appendix.
39According to Imbens and Angrist (1994), the IV estimator is a weighted average of local average treatment
effects with higher weights attributed to those parts of the support of the IV for which changes in the instrument
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The evidence from Table 3 suggests a sizable impact of Chinese trade shocks, passing through a
change in labour market conditions, on crime rate among US CZs. I find that a one percentage point
increase in unemployment rate causes a rise of total arrests by 120 per 100,000 residents, which is to
say that one standard deviation increase in the unemployment causes 165 more crimes. The 2SLS
estimation then yields a 0.78 elasticity of the total arrest rate with respect to the unemployment
rate, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (2), the result for violent crime is
not statistically significant at any conventional level. The effect implies that one percentage point
increase in unemployment rate moves violent crimes by 21 units per 100,000 habitants. By the
same token, the evidence suggests an increase of property crimes by 98.40 The circumstance that
IV estimates are higher than their OLS counterparts suggests that, among the sources of bias, those
that deliver attenuation (such as the measurement error) are likely to play a prominent role.
Table 4: Different Crimes and Unemployment Rate, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007
Panel A: Violent Crimes Murder Rape Robberies Assaults
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Unemployment 0.000 0.001 0.006*** 0.013
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011)
[Elasticity] [0.08] [0.50] [1.42] [0.49]
Panel B: Property Crimes Burglaries Larcenies Vehicle thefts Arson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Unemployment 0.023** 0.069*** 0.007** 0.000
(0.009) (0.023) (0.003) (0.001)
[Elasticity] [0.97] [0.79] [0.89] [0.07]
Panel C: Other Crimes Vandalism Fraud Property stolen Weapons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Unemployment 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.025) (0.002) (0.003)
[Elasticity] [0.23] [0.23] [0.43] [0.50]
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444
Clusters 48 48 48 48
All controls
√ √ √ √
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). Controls are the same as in Table 3. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***
p<.01.
I further investigate the effect of unemployment on crime rate distinguishing by types focusing
on a variety of violent, property and the other crimes. Table 4 shows a clear and strong association
between the worsening of LLM opportunities and the economic crimes. In Panel A, violent crimes
are not responsive and the only exception is the highly statistical significance of the robberies.
On the one hand, they imply the use of the force and this is the main reason why it is generally
categorized under the violent group. On the other hand, UCR defines robbery as the taking or
attempting to take anything of value from a person. It appears clear that robbery is mostly
driven by economic needs, which are triggered by worsening labour conditions, namely increasing
unemployment rate, exacerbated by the increase of Chinese competition. The effect shows an
elasticity of 1.42 suggesting a more than proportional effect. This result is new in the literature
and it implies that one per cent increase in unemployment causes almost 1.5 per cent rise in the
have greater effects on the endogenous variable.




The findings concerning property crimes are fairly substantial, with the exception of arson, which
is not statistically significant. The reasoning seems opposite to the previous case of robberies. UCR
defines arson as any willful or malicious burning or attempting to burn, with or without intent to
defraud, a personal or public property. Consequently, it is legitimate to believe that the increase in
unemployment essentially triggers those crimes related with the need to satisfy economic needs. As
expected, jobloss, induced by Chinese trade shocks, forces the unemployed to switch to the illegal
sector. This is especially true for those who register longer unemployment duration spells.
For the burglary rate, the 2SLS results are positive and significant at five per cent, while for
larceny the evidence is positive and significant at a one per cent confidence interval. Again, when
significant, instrumenting, yields stronger unemployment effects relative to the previous results in
Table 2. Finally, Panel C provides some further evidence using other relevant criminal activities.
Vandalism and weapons possession, which primarily involve the use of violence, do not seem re-
sponsive to changes in unemployment rate stemming from an increase in Chinese competitiveness.
Conversely, the property stolen and the fraud rates are not significant at any conventional level.
The reason behind this evidence relates to the fact that these illegal activities need more “criminal
ability” than, for instance, a simple larceny-theft. In fact property stolen crime is defined as the
buying, receiving, possessing, selling, concealing, or transporting any property with the knowledge
that it has been unlawfully taken (by burglary, larceny or robbery for example). The case of fraud
requires an intentional perversion of inducing another person or other entity in reliance upon it to
part with something of value or to surrender a legal right. Fraudulent conversion and appropriation
of money or property by false pretenses involve a high level of criminal “technicality” both in terms
of resources and organization. The marginal unemployed, who will be more likely to commit a
(property) crime, is the one who at some point switches to the illegal sector in order to satisfy
monetary needs. I expect to find weak effect for the category of crimes, which involves violence or
high “criminal” skills, which implies to have a sort of criminal career. It seems clear that, so far,
evidence shows larger effects for crimes related with an economic need.41
The results for non-economic related crimes can be seen as a further reinforcement of the idea
that displaced workers - due to a rise in China competitiveness - may commit crime to primary
satisfy their economic needs. On top of this, some violent crimes are anyway weakly correlated on
economic conditions; secondly, violent crimes, such as murders or sexual abuses (which I do not
show here), are generally associated with some criminal skills (e.g. the ability to use a weapon),
which are unlikely to be developed in the short term. Therefore, if I find that the measure of
economic activity is also related to crimes for which no link is expected, I should suspect that I
am mistakenly capturing something else (for instance, a surge in crime due to cultural factors that
have nothing to do with the concomitant downturn). This does not appear to be the case. The
empirical evidence finds that the economy does not have any role in murders and sexual crimes.
41All these results are confirmed when I focus on the offenses rates in Table B.4. As expected the effects are larger
with respect to the ones in Table 4.
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4.3 The main mechanism
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that estimates the effect of a long-term change in
trade-induced unemployment on crime rate at US CZ level. Differently from the previous literature,
the 2SLS empirical evidence in this paper yields a larger elasticity of total crime rate with respect
to the unemployment rate, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The most recent
studies, listed in Table 5, try to account for the endogeneity concern in the crime-unemployment
relationship and estimate a property crime elasticity of about 0.3 (Lin, 2008; Raphael and Winter-
Ember, 2001), that is considerably smaller than 0.85, which I find in this paper. This strategy
highlights the long-term change variation in the crime and LLM structure. Given the consequences
of criminal activity, including human capital investments specific to the illegal sector and the
potential for extended periods of incarceration, crime should be more responsive to low-frequency
changes in CZs’ conditions. Due to the measurement error in the independent variables, especially
when measured at state-level, the changes may suffer less from attenuation bias than the estimates
based on annual data, as it has been recently discussed by Gould et al. (2002).
Table 5: Recent literature on crime-unemployment relationship
Authors Analysis IV Instruments Elasticity of Property Crime
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001 State-level panel 1971-97 State military contracts OLS: 0.11
Exposure to oil shocks IV: 0.35
Lin 2008 State-level panel 1974-2000 ∆ in exchange rates and oil prices OLS: 0.15
% State union membership IV: 0.28
% State manufacturing
Although the comparison with previous contributions is not obvious, mainly due to a lack of
general consensus about the crime-unemployment elasticity, I further discuss the implication of the
results presented in Section 4.2. In cases where response to treatment varies across CZs, Imbens and
Angrist (1994) point out that using linear IV gives an estimate of the local average treatment effects
for “compliers” (those induced to get treatment by assignment to the treatment group). Following
Imbens and Angrist’s (1994) LATE interpretation, the subpopulation of compliers would reveal the
causal effect of being unemployed for the marginal individuals whose likelihood of being unemployed
is affected by changes in exposure to Chinese products. This is likely to be an unemployed in the
sector of greater exposure, with relatively higher difficulty to migrate to other CZs and then facing
longer unemployment spells. This interpretation would also reasonably motivate why the IV results
are larger, in magnitude, than OLS ones, which also suffer from well-known attenuation bias.42
shortly (with respect to what)
Additionally, as argued by Becker (1968), the probability of engaging in criminal activities de-
pends on how long an individual takes to exit from unemployment. At the margin, an individual
that remains in unemployment is more likely to become a criminal than her re-employed hypothet-
ical counterpart. Local labour market conditions become more severe the longer an individual is
unemployed and human capital depreciation further decreases expected future employability and
42It is indeed difficult to fully compare the results in here with the ones generally found in the literature, principally,
because of different period, geographical units and subpopulation of compliers.
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potential legal returns. In this study, the instrument is likely to pick up the marginal individual
who will dramatically decrease her employability due to longer unemployment duration.
Table 6: Unemployment Duration and Imports from China, 1990-2007
Unemployment Duration (weeks)
Average Short-term (≤ 14) Medium-term (15-26) Long-term (≥ 27)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Import China-other 0.065*** 0.0004 0.0004*** 0.0007***
(0.019) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
All controls
√ √ √ √
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444
R2 0.512 0.177 0.207 0.644
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). Controls are the same as in Table 3. The dependent variable
in column (1) is average duration at CZ level. From Columns (2) to (4), the dependent variables are the
(change of) percentage of individuals in short, medium and long-term unemployment. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
Table 6 corroborates this hypothesis. The evidence in column (1) suggests a positive correlation
between the change in average unemployment duration and the change in exposure from Chinese
products. It is clearly showed that an increase in import competition from China is associated with a
rise in the average unemployment duration at CZ level. Think of two almost identical US CZs, which
assumably look homogeneous with respect to the most relevant socio-economic and demographic
characteristics such as GDP per capita, population and density, e.g., once again, Buffalo, NY and
Orlando, FL, which hypothetically only differ in their initial industry specialisation. Rising imports
correspond to higher unemployment duration. Thus in this example, Buffalo, NY is likely to face,
ceteris paribus, a larger increase in the average unemployment duration due to a worsening of LLM
opportunities. This may happen as a result of the dramatic structural changes due to the rise in
Chinese exports that are likely to be associated with longer unemployment spells, and that may
constantly decrease the return to legal market and determine an (expected) increase in their risk
to undertake criminal activities. Following this line of reasoning, I would ex ante expect a stronger
association with the CZs characterised by longer unemployment spells. Table 6 shows the results
for short, medium and long-term duration (Krueger et al., 2014).43 On the one hand, there is not
evidence of association between the instrument and the (change in the) share of individuals in short-
term unemployment, as it is displayed in column (2), suggesting no effect for the individuals who
are temporarily unemployed. On the other hand, the exposure to Chinese competion is statistically
significant and correlated with medium and long-term unemployed at 5% and 1% level, respectively:
the larger the import from China the higher the duration in unemployment both in the medium
and the long-term.
The arguments made above are valid in the case of weak migration responses. In order to
correctly identify the effect of unemployment rate on crime rate, I need to avoid any significant
change in the working-age population in each decade. Undoubtedly, a serious concern for the
identification relates to the fact that if labour is highly mobile across regions, trade may affect
workers without its consequences being identifiable at the regional level. Nevertheless, the literature
on regional adjustment to labour-market shocks suggests that mobility responses to labour demand
43The separate results in column (2), (3) and (4) are similar to estimate seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
conditioning on the same set of covariates.
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shocks across US cities and States are slow and incomplete (Topel, 1986; Autor et al., 2013a).









Observations 1444 1444 1444
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). Columns (1) and
(2) show the 2SLS estimations. Column (3) shows the direct
impact of import from China on the change in population.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
It is therefore plausible that the effects of trade shocks on regional labour markets will be evident
over the medium term; indeed, the analysis does not find significant population adjustments for
local labour markets with substantial exposure to imports. The sluggish response of regional
labour supply to import exposure may be related to the costly mobility of labour between sectors,
as documented by Artur et al. (2010) in the United States. In columns (1) and (2) I control whether
the change in import competition, passing through an increase in unemployment, has any impact
on the change of (logarithm) working-age population. Including the decade dummy the coefficient
turns positive but there is no statistical significant evidence that shocks to local labour market lead
to substantial changes in population (Table 7). Moreover, there is no significant direct impact of
increasing exposure from Chinese products and the change in population. These results are in line
with the literature, which underline that mobility responses are slow.
4.4 Robustness checks and further results
In the following Subsection, I conduct some robustness checks to the main specification. I start
by including the prison population rate at CZ level. This is a different measure of deterrence
used in the literature, for example by Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001), and it plays a crucial
role in economic models of crime. The results are shown in column (1) and do not suggest any
difference with respect to the baseline evidence. The coefficient of the change in prison population
is significant at 1% level and it has the expected negative sign. In column (2), I include as a new
covariate, namely the mean log weekly earnings in a CZ. If, plausibly, workers with lower ability
and earnings are more likely to lose their job in the face of an adverse shock (which has been
established with the First-stage), the inclusion should capture a possible wage effect (Gould et al.,
2002). The effect of unemployment on crime rate marginally increases and the “potential” wage
confounding is not at work, as the variable is not significant at any conventional levels. In the last
column, I further control for the share of non-participating individuals in the labour force. The
evidence illustrates a slight increase of the main effect and is still positive and highly significant.
The NILF rate is negatively correlated with the total crime rate, suggesting that the individuals
out of the labour force are less likely to engage in criminal activities. This is a resonable conclusion
considering the fact that, as I explained before, the bulk of this category is comprised of full-time
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homemakers, retirees, students who have no other occupation and people permanently unable to
work, which are in principle less likely to commit a crime.44
Another concern relates to the fact that US exposure to Chinese products may be correlated
with pre-existing trends in the outcome of interest. For this reason, I introduce the initial crime level
for each decade as a new independent variable to rule out that the estimated effects were driven by
a (coincidental) correlation between pre-existing trends and (future) US imports from China. The
result showes that pre-trends had no effect on our estimates of interest, indicating that pre-existing
trends are not likely to be a challenge to the identification strategy, Column (4) in Table 8 shows
the results. Moreover, I conduct a placebo exercise where I regress the changes in crime rates on
future US exposure to Chinese products. In case of pre-existing trends, the regression would yield
statistically significant results. I replicate the specifications in Table 3. Results are presented in
Table B.6. All coefficients are very small in magnitude, with opposite signs to those from Table 3,
and none is statistically significant both for the 2SLS specifications and reduced forms, in Column
(1)-(2) and (3)-(4), respectively. Indeed, pre-existing trends do not seem to be a challenge to the
identification strategy. As a further robustness check, I estimate the main regression including all
the controls at the beginning of each decade. The results are in Table B.5 and they are similar to
the baseline.
Table 8: Robustness Check I, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007
Arrests Total Crime Rate
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Unemployment 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.148*** 0.171*** 0.118***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.059) (0.063) (0.049)
∆Prisoners pc -0.343***
(0.147)




Total Crime (at the initial t) -0.591***
(0.050)
All controls
√ √ √ √ √
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444
1st Stage (F-stat) 26.93 26.76 18.23 18.91 26.55
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). Controls are the same as in Table 3. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***
p<.01.
In this part, I argue that the main empirical evidence is not driven by any outlier in the
distribution of change in trade shock, crime and unemployment rate. Thus I control whether an
extraordinary decade change in one of these variables may have deteriorated the main conclusions.
To do so, I drop from the sample the top and bottom 1 (5) percentile of their distributions. The
results are still similar to the baseline as it is shown in Table B.7, columns (1) to (6).
An additional exploration relates to the heterogeneous effects across macro local economies.
This study helps to shed some light on the nature of the phenomenon I analyse. Concerning the
geographic areas, I split the sample into South-Atlantic versus Central-West zone roughly around
44I also redefine the endogenous variable of interest as the sum of the unemployed individuals and the people not
in labour forces. The results (not shown here) are similar, though the magnitude of the coefficient appears slightly
weaker due to the inclusion of individuals out of the labour forces.
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the Mississippi river as a dividing line between Eastern and Western ’halves’ of the U.S., which
also represents the only way to balance the trade-off between number of observations and capturing
the heterogeneous effects across CZ. In Table 9 there is some evidence of heterogeneous responses
across geographic regions in fact the point estimate is larger for South-Atlantic zone and (smaller)
not significant in the other case, column (1) and (2), respectively. A further evidence, shown in the
last two columns, points in the direction that trade-induced unemployment-crime is larger in the
metropolitan than the rural areas which is in line with the IV strategy.
Table 9: Robustness Check II, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007
Arrests Total Crime Rate
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Unemployment 0.120*** 0.162*** 0.040 0.182* 0.091***
(0.043) (0.039) (0.039) (0.103) (0.031)
All controls
√ √ √ √ √
Sample All South-Atlantic Central-West Metropolitan Small-town/Rural
Observations 1444 664 780 616 828
1st Stage (F-stat) 26.93 30.71 13.9 11.87 32.3
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). Controls are the same as in Table 3. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
To conclude I replicate the main analysis running some sensitivity both on the propensity to
import from China and on the method of estimate. I redefine equation (4) as the Chinese import
exposure per worker in a CZ keeping the propensity to import fixed at the beginning of the first









In this expression Li1990 is the employment in the 1990 in CZ i and ∆Mucjt is the observed
change in US imports from China in industry j between the start and end of the period. I then
estimate the model in fixed-effects (FE) assuming that the errors are serially uncorrelated, while the
first-difference specification (Subsection 4.2) is more efficient in case of random walk errors. Since
before I apply errors clustered on US State the first set of estimates are more robust. The empirical
evidence from column (1) to (3) is similar to the baseline model and the effect of unemployment
rate on crime is larger than the effects in Table 3. Futhermore in columns (4) to (6), I also consider
the use of population weights and, following the recent discussion on the topic (Solon et al., 2015;
Durlauf et al., 2014), I weigh the regression by the share of CZ population. According to Durlauf
et al. (2014), the use of population weights to control for heteroskedasticity in crime rates has almost
little evidentiary support in many model specifications. The past literature justifies the use of the
weights with different assumptions, which range from the specification of the nature of the policy
effect to choices of control variables; from heteroskedasticity corrections to formulations of potential
parameter heterogeneity and the choices of instrumental variables. The use of population weights
has become standard practice in empirical crime studies (Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; Lin,
2008). There are various reasons for including weights, but the usual argument is based on concerns
45Table B.8 (Panel B) shows the results using a slightly different version of equation (4) in which I compute the
exposure to Chinese product per-capita instead of per-worker.
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regarding heteroskedasticity of the residuals. However, it ignores the possibility that location-time-
specific unobservables, such as unmeasured demographic and socio-economic factors, are present
(Durlauf et al., 2014). Consequently, the use of population weights will overweight observations
from more populous counties, leading to invalid confidence intervals, and potentially misleading
point estimates. In other words, models with weights are more likely to find larger effects on crime.
The results in Table B.8, although similar to the baseline (Table 3), may confirm this possibility.
In sum, the analysis in this section supports the previous endings that worsening labour market
conditions, triggered by an unexpected rise in Chinese competition, affect the long-run change
propensity to commit a crime at CZ level.
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5 Conclusions
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first analysis that offers empirical evidence on the effect
of a long-term change in trade-induced unemployment on crime rate triggered by the increase in
the exposure to Chinese trade at US CZ levels. I provide new evidence on the causal effect of
unemployment on crime exploiting the exogenous variation in import exposure to China products
by CZ. Rising import competition has a large LLM effect in terms of increased unemployment rate.
The results presented here consistently indicate that unemployment is a relevant determinant of
the rise in crime rates.
For the first time, an empirical study provides a coherent narrative for the impact of labour
market trade shocks on crime rate through a displacement effect using CZ data. Adverse shocks
to local employment opportunities, stemming from rising competition from China, increase the
propensity to commit economic related crimes. The central finding of the paper, however, is that
trade shocks to labour market outcomes have strikingly and surprisingly parallel impacts on crimes
both in terms of arrests and offenses. Another unique feature of this study relates to the possibility
to map the crime phenomenon for the US mainland including both metropolitan and rural areas.
Although the comparison with previous contributions is not straightforward, mainly because
of the different LATE interpretations, I generally estimate greater elasticity leading to almost
one-to-one relationship between crime and unemployment, which is likely to be induced by longer
duration in unemployment. Trade has significant distributional costs, which are tangible at local
level: Chinese imports determine a sharp increase of unemployment in more trade-exposed labour
markets. Here the focus is on the relationship between crime and unemployment. Thus, I study
another possible collateral effect of import competition which should be a priority in the research
agenda for labour economists.
Additionally, as argued by Becker (1968), the probability of engaging in criminal activities
depends on the length of the individual exit from unemployment. At the margin, the still unem-
ployed individual is more likely to engage in criminal activities than her re-employed counterpart.
An increase in import competition from China is also associated with a fair rise in the average
unemployment duration at CZ level. Two almost identical US CZs, which are hypothetically ho-
mogeneous in the socio-economic aspects, e.g., once again, Buffalo, NY and Orlando, FL, and only
differ in their initial industry specialisation, are differently affected. Furthermore, additionally to
what has been found in the literature by Autor et al. (2013a), rising imports correspond to higher
unemployment duration. Thus, Buffalo, NY is likely to face, ceteris paribus, a major increase in
the average unemployment duration due to a worsening of LLM opportunities. This interpretation
would also suggest the motivation why the IV results are larger, in magnitude, than OLS. The
evidence and arguments made above are valid in the case of weak migration responses, which are
not significant at any conventional level. The robustness checks confirm the main results.
Possibly, the policy-makers should also consider the collateral cost of trade shocks associated
with job displacement. A possibility would be to develope effective tools in order to limit the
chances that the individuals stay out-of-work for long. A potential solution would point in the
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direction of vocational courses which should be designed to help the unemployed to learn, in a
practical way, how to change the specific industry sector. In this way, the individuals who work in
the sectors most exposed to Chinese products, may reduced the probability to be fired, increasing
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Appendix A: Figures
Figure A.1: Import Penetration Ratio for US-China
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China import penetration ratio
Notes: Import penetration is computed as US imports from China divided by total US expenditure on goods, measured
as US gross output plus US imports minus US exports (Autor et al., 2013a).












Figure A.3: United States Maps at CZ Level, over the Period 1990-2000


















Notes: All the variables are ten-year equivalent changes between 1990-2000. Total crime is the sum of violent and
property crimes. Import exposure per worker (in kUSD) is the instrument and it relates to the import from China
to eight high income countries, namely Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and
Switzerland.
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Figure A.4: United States Maps at CZ Level, over the Period 2000-2007


















Notes: All the variables are ten-year equivalent changes between 2000-2007. Total crime is the sum of violent and
property crimes. Import exposure per worker (in kUSD) is the instrument and it relates to the import from China




Table B.1: Summary statistics, 1990-2007
Levels Differences
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Arrests
Total crime (A+B) 0.649 0.365 0.000 2.226 -0.112 0.341 -1.942 1.576
Violent crime (A) 0.143 0.110 0.000 1.006 -0.011 0.097 -0.867 0.429
Property crime (B) 0.506 0.292 0.000 1.774 -0.101 0.280 -1.461 1.268
A. Violent
Murder 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.075 -0.001 0.006 -0.064 0.031
Rape 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.107 -0.002 0.009 -0.058 0.087
Robberies 0.018 0.021 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.016 -0.165 0.112
Aggravated Assault 0.112 0.093 0.000 0.967 -0.008 0.086 -0.927 0.429
B. Property
Burglaries 0.100 0.066 0.000 0.519 -0.022 0.068 -0.416 0.401
Larcenies 0.367 0.228 0.000 1.490 -0.069 0.216 -1.128 0.977
Vehicle thefts 0.033 0.031 0.000 0.610 -0.009 0.033 -0.543 0.177
Arson 0.005 0.010 0.000 0.354 -0.001 0.012 -0.100 0.347
C. Others
Vandalism 0.092 0.070 0.000 0.809 -0.010 0.067 -0.518 0.809
Fraud 0.143 0.209 0.000 2.408 -0.030 0.197 -2.398 1.468
Stolen property 0.030 0.034 0.000 0.640 -0.004 0.031 -0.631 0.241
Weapons possession 0.043 0.035 0.000 0.234 -0.006 0.030 -0.182 0.205
Offenses
A. Violent
Murder 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.087 -0.001 0.006 -0.087 0.047
Rape 0.025 0.019 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.018 -0.090 0.122
Robberies 0.053 0.075 0.000 0.971 -0.005 0.047 -0.731 0.439
Aggravated Assault 0.068 0.130 0.000 1.168 0.102 0.148 0.000 1.168
B. Property
Burglaries 0.643 0.402 0.000 2.594 -0.123 0.309 -2.250 1.103
Larcenies 1.875 1.045 0.000 8.219 -0.280 0.717 -4.554 3.419
Vehicle thefts 0.185 0.181 0.000 1.599 -0.022 0.117 -1.235 0.371
Arson 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.237 -0.004 0.020 -0.213 0.134
Unemployment 4.610 1.375 1.143 13.559 -0.096 1.362 -5.204 5.491
Unemployment duration† 16.590 1.340 12.419 21.619 -0.373 1.232 -4.432 3.982
Import China-others (kUS$)? 1.058 0.700 0.311 1.990 1.755 2.085 -0.723 28.655
Age: 15-34
White 0.231 0.052 0.035 0.445 -0.022 0.020 -0.096 0.106
Black 0.027 0.039 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.005 -0.026 0.055
Asian 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.075 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.016
Age: 35-49
White 0.183 0.033 0.032 0.283 -0.002 0.024 -0.084 0.098
Black 0.016 0.024 0.000 0.136 0.002 0.006 -0.028 0.042
Asian 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.064 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.021
Age: 50-64
White 0.148 0.035 0.038 0.311 0.023 0.015 -0.022 0.095
Black 0.010 0.016 0.000 0.117 0.002 0.005 -0.008 0.041
Asian 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.041 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.012
No college 0.220 0.099 0.033 0.643 -0.065 0.063 -0.210 0.073
High school degree 0.617 0.073 0.283 0.767 0.039 0.053 -0.068 0.190
Federal assistance pc (kUS$)‡ 269.498 158.485 24.860 1237.341 20.136 69.476 -237.047 361.914
Republicans (share) 0.541 0.118 0.159 0.901 0.027 0.144 -0.276 0.348
Police force pc 0.008 0.014 0.000 0.196 -0.007 0.016 -0.191 0.009
Prisoners pc 0.004 0.027 0.000 0.911 0.001 0.026 -0.907 0.110
Average wage (log) 8.117 6.652 -10.631 37.523
NILF§ 26.003 5.520 13.140 48.717 -0.925 2.714 -14.701 7.988
Notes: All the variables are rates so they are divided by the working-age population at CZ level. Arrests and Offenses are
scaled by 100 for the ease of interpretation. † Average duration of an unemployment spell in weeks. ? The import China-others
is divided by the workers in 1980, 1990 and 2000 following the construction of the instrument. ‡ Federal income assistance
includes the SSI, AFDC/TANF, and SNAP programs. § Individuals not in labour force. The commuting zones are 722 so the
observations in levels are 2166 (1444 in differences).
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Table B.2: Violent, Property Crime and Unemployment, First-Difference Regressions, 1990-2007
Arrests Panel A: Total Violent Crime Rate Panel B: Total Property Crime Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Unemployment 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.033*** 0.019* 0.021** 0.016* 0.015*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
[Elasticity] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.08] [0.08] [0.28] [0.16] [0.18] [0.14] [0.13]
γt -0.012** 0.008 0.009 0.018 0.020 -0.059*** 0.029 0.036 0.016 0.021
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.027) (0.026) (0.016) (0.035) (0.029) (0.073) (0.072)
∆Age 15-34
White 0.223 0.535** 0.492** 0.523*** 1.642*** 2.367*** 2.563*** 2.634***
(0.193) (0.250) (0.196) (0.195) (0.532) (0.744) (0.658) (0.675)
Black -0.383 -0.101 -0.148 -0.192 -4.393** -3.463* -3.313* -3.415*
(0.992) (1.047) (1.042) (1.054) (1.672) (1.923) (1.857) (1.860)
Asian -2.974 -3.613 -3.514 -3.245 -2.423 -2.343 -2.848 -2.232
(2.386) (2.748) (2.576) (2.544) (6.508) (7.196) (6.602) (6.581)
∆Age 35-49
White 0.264 -0.085 -0.033 -0.093 -1.017 -1.900 -2.082* -2.218*
(0.195) (0.259) (0.265) (0.284) (1.069) (1.174) (1.212) (1.231)
Black 0.126 -0.942 -1.037 -0.991 2.647 -0.929 -0.619 -0.515
(1.417) (1.322) (1.230) (1.224) (3.897) (3.119) (3.191) (3.187)
Asian -3.957 -2.803 -3.124 -3.077 -24.470* -21.719 -20.434 -20.327
(4.883) (4.856) (4.765) (4.809) (13.459) (13.439) (12.906) (12.704)
∆Age 50-64
White -0.010 -0.235 -0.210 -0.267 -1.502** -1.990** -2.137*** -2.269***
(0.183) (0.224) (0.230) (0.224) (0.631) (0.769) (0.730) (0.768)
Black -1.008* -1.459** -1.356* -1.328* -2.774 -4.213** -4.718** -4.655**
(0.507) (0.669) (0.783) (0.771) (1.922) (1.997) (2.076) (2.066)
Asian -3.822 -1.960 -2.573 -2.794 -26.946 -17.124 -15.651 -16.155
(3.998) (4.533) (3.874) (3.802) (20.378) (20.280) (20.156) (19.795)
∆No Diploma -0.031 0.040 0.076 0.697 0.462 0.544
(0.221) (0.230) (0.228) (0.686) (0.664) (0.655)
∆High School 0.320 0.379* 0.390* 1.929** 1.720** 1.746**
(0.241) (0.226) (0.223) (0.829) (0.772) (0.775)
∆Federal assistance 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Republicans 0.008 0.000 -0.079 -0.098
(0.129) (0.127) (0.334) (0.330)
∆Police forces -0.373 -0.851
(0.383) (0.949)
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444
Clusters 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.007 0.035 0.052 0.058 0.061 0.036 0.175 0.200 0.208 0.210
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). The dependent variable is total crime rate which includes both violent and property crime. All the
variables are expressed in first-difference (rates). Arrests are scaled by 100 for the ease of interpretation. All regressions include a dummy for the
2000-2007 period (γt). The reference category for the race profile, the level of education and the voters are Indians, individuals who obtained at
least a bachelor degree and percentage of people who voted Democratic party, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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Table B.3: Total Crime and Unemployment Rate, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007
Arrests Total Crime Rate Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate
Panel A: 2nd Stage (1) (2) (3)
∆Unemployment 0.120*** 0.021 0.098***
(0.043) (0.013) (0.032)
γt 0.389*** 0.033 0.358***
(0.133) (0.036) (0.106)
∆Age 15-34
White 0.897 0.381* 0.506
(0.785) (0.205) (0.649)
Black -3.224 -0.149 -3.079
(2.833) (1.076) (2.090)
Asian 2.600 -2.171 4.783
(8.655) (2.375) (6.849)
∆Age 35-49
White -0.557 -0.080 -0.458
(1.411) (0.344) (1.138)
Black 1.729 -0.736 2.464
(3.827) (1.125) (2.949)
Asian -36.996** -5.868 -31.149***
(15.293) (5.110) (11.850)
∆Age 50-64
White 0.827 0.112 0.699
(1.061) (0.295) (0.866)
Black -10.400*** -2.145*** -8.267***
(2.601) (0.832) (2.118)
Asian -5.225 -1.523 -3.563
(17.040) (3.956) (15.233)
∆No Diploma -2.327* -0.190 -2.133**
(1.280) (0.353) (0.997)
∆High School 0.970 0.275 0.703
(1.164) (0.273) (0.939)
∆Federal assistance 0.000 -0.000* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Republicans -0.110 0.014 -0.126
(0.463) (0.134) (0.341)
∆Police forces -1.874 -0.342 -1.572
(1.284) (0.371) (0.990)
Constant -0.437*** -0.026 -0.412***
(0.082) (0.021) (0.072)
Observations 1444 1444 1444
Clusters 48 48 48
R2 0.013 0.001 0.041
RMSE 0.339 0.097 0.275




Kleibergen-Paap LM test (p-value) 0.000
C.D.W. F-stat 63
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). The dependent variables are total, violent and property
crime in column (1), (2) and (3), respectively. All the variables are expressed in first-difference (rates).
Arrests are scaled by 100 for the ease of interpretation. All regressions include a dummy for the 2000-
2007 period (γt). The reference category for the race profile, the level of education and the voters
are Indians, individuals who obtained at least a bachelor degree and percentage of people who voted
Democratic party, respectively. First-stage estimates in Panel B also include the control variables that
are indicated in the second-stage. The instrument in all the regressions is Chinese imports in eight
developed countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * p<.10 **
p<.05 *** p<.01.
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Table B.4: Offenses and Unemployment Rate, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007
Panel A: Violent Crime Murder Rape Robberies Assaults
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Unemployment 0.000 0.004* 0.010*** -0.021
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.021)
[Elasticity] [0.00] [0.67] [0.80] [−1.30]
Panel B: Property Crime Burglaries Larcenies Vehicle thefts Arson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Unemployment 0.116*** 0.367*** 0.033*** 0.004*
(0.035) (0.083) (0.011) (0.002)
[Elasticity] [0.76] [0.83] [0.75] [0.88]
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444
Clusters 48 48 48 48
All controls
√ √ √ √
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). Controls are the same as in Table 3. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***
p<.01.
Table B.5: Total Crime and Unemployment Rate, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007 (initial decade)
Arrests Total Crime Rate Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate
Panel A: 2nd Stage (1) (2) (3)
∆Unemployment 0.125*** 0.035*** 0.090***
(0.039) (0.013) (0.028)
0.208*** 0.038* 0.171***
γt (0.069) (0.022) (0.053)
∆Age 15-34
White -0.775* -0.063 -0.710*
(0.466) (0.112) (0.390)
Black 4.455** 0.861* 3.590**
(1.975) (0.494) (1.556)
Asian 6.407 -0.269 6.665
(6.498) (1.238) (5.904)
∆Age 35-49
White 1.673 0.264 1.403
(1.126) (0.272) (0.914)
Black -10.793* -0.97 -9.810**
(6.091) (1.476) (4.829)
Asian -32.309* -9.989** -22.223
(19.431) (5.077) (16.078)
∆Age 50-64
White 0.472 -0.174 0.65
(0.780) (0.239) (0.614)
Black 5.984 -1.308 7.279
(6.907) (1.865) (5.518)
Asian 32.905 13.618* 19.142
(33.553) (7.695) (27.889)
∆No Diploma 1.225*** 0.202* 1.022***
(0.410) (0.115) (0.309)
∆High School -0.274 -0.089 -0.186
(0.318) (0.089) (0.248)
∆Federal assistance -0.001 -0.000** 0
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Republicans 0.025 0.009 0.018
(0.176) (0.052) (0.130)
∆Police forces 1.047 0.116 0.968
(1.210) (0.334) (0.966)




Observations 1444 1444 1444
Clusters 48 48 48




Kleibergen-Paap LM test (p-value) 0.000
C.D.W. F-stat 59.2
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). All the controls are the same as in Table 3 but the variables
are set at the beginning of each decade. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state
level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
45
Table B.6: Placebo tests
Total Crime
2SLS estimates OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Unemployment -0.025 -0.044
(0.024) (0.032)




Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). Total crime rate is
computed between 1975-1980 and 1980-1990. Controls are the same
as in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
Table B.7: Robustness Check III, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007
Arrests Panel A: drop p1/p99 Panel B: drop p5/p95
Total Crime Rate Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Unemployment 0.120*** 0.118** 0.113*** 0.136*** 0.127* 0.083*** 0.158**
(0.043) (0.053) (0.032) (0.052) (0.067) (0.026) (0.062)
Drop in import from China
√ √





√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 1444 1415 1416 1413 1300 1298 1297
1st Stage (F-stat) 26.93 40.76 26.92 27.62 24.16 24.85 33.42
Notes: N = 1444 (722 CZ x 2 time periods). Controls are the same as in Table 3. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
Table B.8: Robustness Check IV, 2SLS Regressions, 1990-2007
Panel A: the instrument is per-worker Chinese exposure (in 1990)
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Unemployment 0.201*** 0.038** 0.163*** 0.431** 0.036 0.396**
(0.042) (0.011) (0.035) (0.201) (0.040) (0.174)
All controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166
1st Stage (F-stat) 18.94 18.94 18.94 6.43 6.43 6.43
Weights
√ √ √
Panel B: the instrument is per-capita Chinese exposure (in 1990)
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Unemployment 0.173*** 0.029** 0.145*** 0.300** 0.016 0.284***
(0.032) (0.008) (0.027) (0.123) (0.027) (0.105)
All controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166
1st Stage (F-stat) 23.17 23.17 23.17 13.7 13.7 13.7
Weights
√ √ √
Notes: N = 2166 (722 CZ x 3 time periods). Controls are the same as in Table 3. In parentheses the robust standard errors.
* Models (4), (5) and (6) are weighted by the CZ share of working-age population. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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